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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COLUMBIA IRON MINING COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
ra. 
IRON COUNTY, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Intervener and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Here is presented the legal question of the propriety 
of the judiciary reading into an otherwise silent and 
unambiguous tax statute a provision in substance as 
follows: 
A bona fide and reasonable contract price for the 
sale of ores for a definite period, resulting in a sub-
stantial profit, and negotiated at arm's length between 
the mine owner and buyer, may be disregarded for tax 
purposes in the event the buyer subsequently assigns 
his interest in the contract to a corporation the stock 
of which, except for directors' qualifying shares, hap-
pens to be owned by a corporation which also owns 
the capital stock of the selling mine owner. 
Case No. 
7503 
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9 
L 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute and concisely stated 
are as follows: 
1. The seller is plaintiff, Columbia Iron Mining 
Company; the buyer was the United States acting 
through its wholly owned subsidiary, the Defense Plant 
Corporation. The contract hereafter referred to as Ex-
hibit 1 is dated August 17, 1943; in brief it provides that 
for an 18-year term Columbia will furnish described iron 
ore requirements to the buyer for the operation of the 
blast furnaces at Geneva, Utah, at cost plus a stated 
price per ton. (R, 71) The Court below found this to 
result in a profit of 25 cents per ton. (R. 95) For the 
year 1948 performance of this contract resulted in "net 
proceeds" to Columbia in the sum of $566,560.88. (R. 95) 
2. Plaintiff was organized as an Utah corporation 
in 1930. (R. 75) It owns and leases certain mining 
properties and facilities within the limits of defendant 
Iron County, Utah, including what is generally known 
as the Columbia Iron Mine. (R. 87) 
3. Since its organization and specifically since 
1937, plaintiff has always reported each year to the inter-
venor, State Tax Commission, its "Net proceeds in 
dollars" as required by Section 80-5-55(4), Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, being its receipts from sales of iron ore 
under its various ore contracts, including Exhibit 1, less 
the specified deductions. For the years 1943 to 1947 
the Tax Commission accepted such returns, but for the 
year 1948, after the buyer's end of the agreement (Ex-
2 
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hibit 1) was acquired from the Government by Geneva 
Steel Company, the Tax Commission substituted its own 
computation of gross value of the ore per ton. Geneva 
Steel Company is likewise a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the United States Steel Corporation. This substitu-
tion resulted in a tax increase from $37,664.42 to $74,-
905.76. Plaintiff protested this substitution and on 
November 26, 1948 paid the excess of $37,241.34 under 
protest. (R. 96) This action to recover such protested 
excess was then brought in April of 1949. (R. 7) 
4. Six certain additional contracts of plaintiff for 
the sale of iron ores during the time here involved are 
tabulated in Exhibit B. These sales were in small 
amounts, involving only 731.2 tons, and required special 
handling. (R. 89) In addition to these contracts and 
that of August 17, 1943 is a second "term requirement 
contract" for the supply of the Ironton No. 2 blast fur-
nace. This contract likewise was entered into with the 
United States, is dated August 1, 1947, and was subse-
quently assigned by the United States Government to 
Kaiser & Frazer Parts Corporation, which is now the 
owner of that blast furnace. (R. 96) 
5. Plaintiff, to expedite this case and eliminate 
disputed questions of fact, has admitted for the purposes 
of this case only that the substituted value figure of 
$1.45 per ton invoked by the Tax Commission (in lieu 
of 71c) may be treated as true, correct and proper if 
the Tax Commission has the legal right to substitute 
any figure for the proceeds actually received by plain-
tiff under its various ore contracts. (R. 95, 78, 69) 
3 
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6. The foregoing, being in substance the facts al-
leged in plaintiff's complaint, were admitted by defen-
dant and intervenor. (E. 73) These facts were then 
supplemented by the following, stipulated likewise but 
subject to plaintiff's objections as to materiality and 
relevancy: (E. 34) 
(a) Various other contracts were entered into be-
tween the United States and wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of the United States Steel Corporation prior to, at the 
time of, and subsequent to the date of execution of 
Exhibit 1, dated August 17, 1943. These include: 
(1) An agreement under date of October 31, 1941 
which provided for the construction of the Geneva steel 
works by Columbia Steel Company for Defense Plant 
Corporation. This agreement was subsequently sup-
plemented by various letters of intent issued by Defense 
Plant Corporation covering various changes in the pro-
gram, and was amended by Amendatory Agreement 
dated August 17, 1943 so as to eliminate therefrom pro-
visions relating to the leasing of the facilities to Colum-
bia Steel Company, with the result that this agreement 
then covered only the acquisition and construction of 
such facilities. (E. 90) 
(2) An agreement hereafter denoted Exhibit E, 
executed under date of August 17, 1943 between Defense 
Plant Corporation and Geneva Steel Company for the 
management and operation of the iron and steel-produc-
ing facilities at Geneva, including facilities for mining 
coal in Emery County, for quarrying limestone and dolo-
mite, for sale of the products thereof, and for the gen-
4 
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era! conduct of the business by Geneva Steel Company 
for the account of Defense Plant Corporation. (E. 90, 
54) 
(3) An agreement of purchase hereafter denoted 
Exhibit C, betwen the United States and Geneva Steel 
Company effective as of midnight June 18, 1946 for the 
sale of the Geneva works to the Geneva Steel Company. 
(B. 93, 44) This agreement was in accordance with the 
bid of the United States Steel Corporation dated May 
1, 1946 for the purchase of the Geneva works including 
all rights, properties and interests acquired by the Fed-
eral Government agencies in connection with the matters 
mentioned in the three foregoing contracts and includ-
ing the machinery and equipment owned by the Gov-
ernment at Columbia Iron Mine. The said bid recited 
that if accepted "title will be taken by Columbia Steel 
Company or another wholly owned subsidiary of United 
States Steel Company/' (E. 93) 
(b) The machinery and equipment at the Columbia 
Iron Mine referred to in Exhibit 1 as being leased to 
plaintiff was acquired by the Federal Government from 
the various manufacturers of such machinery and equip-
ment pursuant to said contract between the Government 
and Columbia Steel Company of October 31, 1941 and 
the amendment thereto of August 17, 1943, and such 
machinery and equipment is also referred to in the 
recital of Exhibit 1, being the iron ore requirement con-
tract between the Government and plaintiff of August 
17, 1943, as then "being installed at the said mines by 
Columbia Steel Company''. The cost paid by the Gov-
ernment for this machinery and equipment, so acquired 
5 
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by it and placed at the iron ore mines and leased to plain-
tiff, was $1,350,000.00, of which $522,000.00 was expended 
for items classified as "machinery and equipment", and 
the balance was expended for a preliminary crusher, a 
secondary crusher, a screening and loading station, utili-
ties and sundry other buildings. (R. 91) 
(c) Commencing in 1942 and continuing since the 
contract of August 17, 1943 (Ex. 1) and the assignment 
of this contract to Geneva Steel Company, plaintiff, in 
addition to delivering the iron ore to the Geneva plant, 
has also continued deliveries of iron ore to the plant at 
Ironton, and has charged the same prices at which such 
ores were charged on deliveries to the Geneva plant 
pursuant to Exhibit 1. The Ironton plant was owned 
and operated by Columbia Steel Company up to about 
October 1, 1946, and by Geneva Steel Company since 
that time, and plaintiff has reported gross and net pro-
ceeds on deliveries to both plants on the same basis of 
charges and values as aforesaid. All iron ore treated 
at the Geneva plant and at the Ironton plant during 
the years 1945, 1946 and 1947 was supplied from the 
Columbia Iron Mine in Iron County, Utah here involved. 
(R. 89) The relative capacities of the two plants were 
found by the court to be 4 to 1, although the record is 
silent in this respect and the actual relative capacities 
are approximately 6 to 1. (R, 92, 83) 
(d) Pursuant to the foregoing bid and contract 
(Ex. C and D), title to the Geneva Steel works, including 
the buyer's end of Exhibit 1 and the machinery and 
equipment acquired at the Columbia Iron Mine by the 
Government, was acquired by Geneva Steel Company 
6 
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as purchaser, and thereafter the machinery and equip-
ment acquired at the Columbia Iron Mine was trans-
ferred to the plaintiff. There was allocated to plaintiff 
as a charge therefor and as a portion of the general 
obligations to be paid by Geneva Steel Company and 
guaranteed by the United States Steel Corporation, the 
sum of $273,274.10. Thereupon, all obligations under 
said contract Exhibit 1 on behalf of the buyer, including 
but not limited to all obligations to furnish funds, equip-
ment or machinery, were performed in accordance with 
the terms of the contract. That is, the contract (Ex-
hibit 1) as then outstanding between Geneva Steel Com-
pany and Columbia Iron Mining Company was reduced 
by performance to the one contract provision for the 
supply of iron ore to Geneva Steel plant and for the 
purchase of and payment for that ore in accordance 
with said contract. All other provisions of this con-
tract as to both parties were thus terminated as pro-
vided therein, but the contract terms as recited therein 
were not changed and the contract itself was not 
amended. (R.94) 
(e) The contract of October 13, 1941 for the con-
struction of Geneva, including the amendment of August 
17, 1943, the contract of August 17, 1943 for its opera-
tion, as well as Exhibit 1, the contract of August 17, 
1943 for the supply by plaintiff of Geneva's iron re-
quirements, were all entered into for the purpose of 
furthering the war effort. The first two contracts, for 
construction by Columbia Steel Company and operation 
by Geneva Steel Company, were pursuant to a decision 
of the United States Steel Corporation and an under-
7 
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standing thereupon with Federal Government agencies 
that the construction and operation of the Geneva Steel 
plant, as covered by said contracts, would be at the 
expense of Defense Plant Corporation and without loss 
or profit to the United States Steel Corporation directly, 
or through its subsidiaries, during the war effort. (R. 91) 
Exhibit 1, the iron ore requirements contract with Co-
lumbia Iron Mining Company, in contrast is a "cost-
plus-25 cents-per-ton" contract involving plaintiff's iron 
ore supply. (R. 95) 
(f) For the years 1937 to 1942 the Tax Commission 
substituted for the plaintiff's contract prices a gross 
value per ton in excess of the contract price established 
in the agreement for the supply of iron ore for the blast 
furnace at Ironton, Utah, which during that period was 
owned and operated by Columbia Steel Company. The 
resulting excess tax over that reported, as shown by 
Exhibit A (R. 88) was paid by plaintiff under protest. 
(R. 87, 88) 
7. From the foregoing and over plaintiff's objec-
tions the court further found and concluded: 
(a) That the three contracts between the Govern-
ment and the subsidiary corporations of the United 
States Steel Corporation were made in fact under the 
full control of United States Steel Corporation, and the 
operations thereunder were by it, operating through 
its respective subsidiaries, as named in each agreement. 
(R. 93) That the placing of titles to any acquired pro-
perties, and the allocation of charges, and the termina-
tion or continuance of contract covenants was by and 
8 
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under the complete control of United States Steel 
Corporation, which alone could profit by any such, or by 
any operations of its said wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
(R. 94) 
(b) That the statutes do not require under such 
circumstances acceptance of the contract receipts as the 
basis for tax computation, that the reported tax was 
unjust, unequal, discriminatory and in violation of 
Utah's Constitution, statutes and policy, and that the 
tax imposed was fair and just and should be sustained. 
(R. 97) 
8. Judgment of no cause of action accordingly 
was duly made and entered February 20, 1950, (R. 99) 
from which plaintiff has appealed. (R. 100) 
II. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
(a) Section 4 of Article XI I I of the Utah Consti-
tution provides that the State Tax Commission shall 
assess mines " a s the Legislature shall provide;". Sec-
tion 80-5-3 of the Utah Code Annotated 1943 accordingly 
provides that the State Tax Commission must assess 
"a l l mines and mining claims, and the value of metallif-
erous mines" based on a multiple of the annual net 
proceeds as provided in subsequent sections. 
(b) By Section 80-5-55 the State Tax Commission 
is required each year to prepare a mine assessment book 
in which is to be entered " the assessment of all mines 
9 
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in the state subject to assessment by it and in which 
book must be specified in separate columns and under 
appropriate heads: 
" (4) Net proceeds in dollars, if a metalliferous 
mine. 
" ( 5 ) Number of tons of ore mined, whether by 
the owner, lessee, contractor or otherwise. 
" (6) Amount received fo<r ore and metal if sold; 
if not sold the value thereof." 
(c) Section 80-5-56 as amended then provides: 
"Al l metalliferous mines and mining claims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed 
at $5.00 per acre and in addition thereto at a value 
equal to two times the net annual proceeds there-
of for the calendar year next preceding." 
(d) The following section, 80-5-57, then provides: 
"The words, 'net annual proceeds/ of a 
metalliferous mine or mining claim are defined 
to be the gross proceeds realized during the pre-
ceding calendar year from the sale or conversion 
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such 
mine or mining claims extracted by the owner or 
lessee, contractor or other person working upon 
or operating the property, including all dumps 
and tailings, during or previous to the year for 
which the assessment is made 
less only certain deductions therein enumerated. (There 
is no question with respect to the deductions.) 
10 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in that the amounts actually re-
ceived and realized by plaintiff from the sale of its 
ore under bona fide and reasonable contracts were 
disregarded. 
2. The court erred in sustaining and basing the 
assessment of plaintiff's mine on the Commission's 
conception of the gross value of the ore produced and 
sold in 1947, rather than on the amount of money received 
and realized by plaintiff from the sale of its ores under 
bona fide and reasonable contracts. 
3. The court erred in disregarding corporate en-
tities in this instance where the original contract was 
bona fide and reasonable, the price fixed therein was 
reached after arm's length negotiations between non-
affiliated interests, resulted in a 25 cents per ton profit, 
and was for a fixed term. 
4. The court erred in concluding that for the Com-
mission to act in accordance with the statutes and to 
compute the tax on the basis of actual contract receipts 
would result in an unjust, unequal and discriminatory 
tax, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution, 
statutes, and policy of the State of Utah, and the duty 
imposed upon the State Tax Commission by these. 
5. The court erred in entering judgment against 
plaintiff of no cause of action. 
11 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Since all of the errors assigned on the part of plain-
tiff relate to the same fundamental issue, they are 
argued here under the following headings: 
1. Exhibit 1, the contract of August 17, 1943, was 
bona fide and the price therein was arrived at after arm's 
length negotiations between unaffiliated interests. 
Exhibit 1 is a " t e rm requirement contract" for an 
18-year period whereby plaintiff is obligated to supply 
the United States Government or its successor with the 
iron ore requirements for the operation of the Geneva 
Steel works for that definite period. I t is submitted that 
the contract was fair and reasonable resulting in a profit 
of 25 cents per ton on a gross of 71 cents. Both parties 
were satisfied with the contract and abided by its terms. 
There is no suggestion in the record or any claim on the 
part of defendant or intervenor of any bad faith in the 
negotiations and transactions between the plaintiff and 
the United States, or that the cost-plus price fixed 
therein was in any sense unreasonable at the time of 
execution. A similar contract executed four years later 
is in effect although now assigned by the United States 
to the Kaiser interests, with which plaintiff has no inter-
corporate relationships. 
The contract was not only well within the uniform 
definitions in the sales act (Title 81 of the Utah Code); 
it was without question a bona fide and reasonable 
agreement at the time of the execution of the agreement 
between the plaintiff and the United States. 
12 
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" 'Bona fide' is a legal technical expres-
sion ; and the law of Great Britain and this coun-
try has annexed a certain idea to it. I t is a term 
used in statutes in England, and in acts of assem-
bly in all the states, and signifies a thing done 
really, with a good faith, without fraud, or deceit, 
or collusion, or trust. * * *A debt must be bona 
fide at the time of its commencement, or it never 
can become so afterwards." Ware v. Hulton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 241,1 L. Ed. 568. 
"Bona f ide" means " in or with good faith; 
without fraud or deceit; genuine." Covert v. 
State Board of Equalization, 173 P. (2) 545, 550; 
29 Cal. (2) 125. 
This court recently said with respect to the com-
panion occupation tax statute, Section 80-5-66: 
"Webster ' s new International Dictionary de-
fines 'bona fide' as being 'in or with good faith; 
without fraud or deceit* * *'." Combined Metals 
Eeduction Co. v. State Tax Commission, (Utah) 
176 P (2) 614, 616. 
2. A contract which was executed in good faith, was 
binding for a fixed term, and was bona fide at the time of 
its execution does not lose those characteristics by reason 
of subsequent events. 
A contract that is bona fide when executed does not 
lose that character because of events occurring subse-
quent to its execution. Dubuque & Sioux City R.R. Co. 
v. Richmond, 86 U.S. 584, 22 L. Ed. 173. 
To date it has never been argued or contended that 
a contract executed between non-affiliates would not be 
binding upon the Commission even though the consider-
13 
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ation to be paid for the ores might become more or less 
than their market value. This is specifically illustrated 
in this case in connection with the outstanding contract 
with Kaiser-Frazer, and with respect to Exhibit 1 while 
the Government was the contracting party. Particularly 
as judged by hindsight, a mine owner might make im-
provident contracts; or the same result, i.e., less net 
proceeds, may result from either improvident manage-
ment or events beyond control. But in no such case 
would the Tax Commission presume to disobey the legis-
lative mandate. 
That mandate of the legislature is pursuant to a 
specific constitutional provision providing for the ad 
valorem taxation of a mine on the basis of a multiple of 
the net proceeds actually realized by that mine. In other 
words, the Constitutional provision delegates specific 
authority to the legislature to determine the details of 
mine assessment methods; and the legislature has estab-
lished as Utah's policy mine income as the basis upon 
which to ascertain mine values. 
The value of the Columbia Iron Mine is to a large 
extent determined by the proceeds derived from its 
products. Particularly is this true in an instance where 
approximately the entire production of the mine is sub-
ject to the terms of a single contract. Certainly any 
purchaser of the assets or stock of the Company would 
be bound by the terms of Exhibit 1 and of the Kaiser-
Frazer contract, and the value of the mine would be 
determined accordingly. Likewise, Geneva Steel Com-
pany had a right to rely upon the terms of Exhibit 1 
remaining in effect, just as any other purchaser of the 
14 
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Geneva Steel Plant would have taken the existence of 
Exhibit 1 into effect in considering how much it would 
pay; and as Kaiser-Frazer did in purchasing Ironton 
No. 2. 
In this case, insofar as the supply of iron ore to 
Geneva and to Ironton No. 2 were concerned, the gross 
price to be received was fixed after arm's length bar-
gaining between unaffiliated interests at the time the 
contracts were negotiated. This satisfied the legislative 
intent, and plaintiff submits that the legislature could 
not have had in mind changing the situation in the un-
. usual event that the subsequent assignment of any such 
term requirement contract, so negotiated at arm's length, 
resulted in the buying end of the contract being acquired 
by another affiliate of the mine owner. 
Yet first this legislative prescience to anticipate 
such a situation, and then this specific intent for the 
particular solution here urged, would be plucked from 
the air by defendant to justify its contentions and in-
serted by implication into Utah's statutes. But unless 
such intent is clearly and convincingly evident from all 
circumstances which properly may be considered by the 
judiciary in determining the "legislative mind," to so 
read these principles into Utah's law would be judicial 
legislation. 
I t might just as well be contended that should any 
contract prove to bring less receipts to the mine owner 
than might have been obtained, the legislature would have 
intended disregard of the actual receipts and silent dele-
gation to the Tax Commission of the power to determine 
values. 
15 
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There is here no proper key or even clue to the 
legislative intent in such instances. 
We quote from 50 Am. Jur . at page 212: 
§ 228. Avoidance of Judicial Legislation.— 
As a result of constitutional provisions distri-
buting the power of government among three 
departments, the legislative, executive and judi-
cial, courts have no legislative authority, and 
should avoid judicial legislation, a usurpation of 
legislative powers, or an entry into the legis-
lative field. It is not within the province of a 
court, in the course of construction of a statute, 
to make or supervise legislation. A statute may 
not, under the guise of interpretation, be modi-
fied, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or 
rewritten, or given a construction of which its 
words are not susceptible, or which is repugnant 
to its terms. The terms of the statute may not be 
disregarded. To depart from the meaning ex-
pressed by the words of a statute, is to alter it, 
and is not construction, but legislation. However, 
words or phrases may be altered where that is 
necessary to obviate repugnancy and inconsis-
tency and to give effect to the manifest intention 
of the legislature. Especially will this be done 
where it is necessary to prevent a law from 
becoming a nullity. 
§ 229. Extension of Statute.— The general 
rule is that nothing may be read into a statute 
which is not within the manfest intention of the 
legislature as gathered from the act itself, and 
that a statute should not be construed any more 
broadly or given any greater effect than its terms 
require. Where the language of the statute is 
clear in limiting its application to a particular 
class of cases and leaves no room for doubt as 
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to the intention of the legislature, there is no 
authority to transcend or add to the statute which 
may not be enlarged, stretched, or expanded, or 
extended to cognate or related cases not falling 
within its provisions. 
If we have a clue at all to the "legislative intent" 
when it enacted the net proceeds system of mine taxa-
tion, it is that the legislature until 1949 refused to act 
even as to contracts initially executed between corporate 
affiliate; and this though the possibility of purposeful 
discrepancy between contract price and possible market 
values was specifically brought to its attention in pages 
21-22 of the Tax Commission's official Third Biennial 
Report to the Legislature for 1935-36: 
As the law now stands this company could 
organize a separate corporation for the purpose 
of operating the mining property. This subsid-
iary corporation could sell its ores to the parent 
milling or smelting corporation and then the state 
would be required to accept as gross proceeds the 
sum which the parent corporation paid the min-
ing corporation for its ores. Where a mining 
company is a subsidiary of a milling and smelting 
company, it might sell its ores to the parent cor-
poration at a price that would tend to greatly 
reduce the gross proceeds of the mine. 
Since this simple device of establishing a 
subsidiary corporation may be adopted, it would 
be advisable to provide that the Tax Commission 
could inquire into the reasonableness of the price 
paid for the ores. Even if such authority were 
granted to us we still would have difficulty in 
executing it, because that is the work of experts, 
and in almost every instance such experts are in 
the employ of the major milling and smelting 
companies. 
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There are many such mining corporations 
subsidiary to milling and smelting companies. 
One smelting company has as many as ten subsid-
iary mining corporations. We do not mean to 
charge that the subsidiaries were established to 
further tax avoidance, but we merely point out 
that tax avoidance is possible through the use 
of this device. 
We believe that more authority should be 
granted the Tax Commission to permit it to 
make full inquiry into the price received for the 
ores of such subsidiary mining corporations when 
they sell their ores to a parent milling or smelt-
ins: company. An amendment should be added in 
substance as follows: 
"Where a sale is made by a mining corpora-
tion of its ores to an affiliated corporation or 
company, the burden of proving that the price 
received was a fair one shall rest upon the min-
ing corporation. For this purpose the Tax Com-
mission shall have authority to make such inves-
tigations as it deems necessary. In the absence 
of satisfactory proof that the price received is 
a fair one, the Tax Commission is authorized to 
determine from the best information available, 
what the gross proceeds should have been from 
the sale of the ores ." 
I t was after the legislature rejected its views pre-
sented above, that between 1937 and 1942 the Tax Com-
mission imposed its own values per Exhibit A. But 
the amounts were relatively inconsequential, so plaintiff 
contented itself with protests until the instant case, the 
Commission having accepted the contract proceeds with-
out question for the years 1943-46 inclusive. 
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This situation is in direct contrast with that in 
Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
176 P (2) 879, where on rehearing it was shown, clearly 
and convincingly to obtain reversal of the original de-
cision, just what the legislature of Utah must have actu-
ally had in mind when it enacted the Use Tax Law in 
1937. But here, until the details with respect to such a 
situation were carefully and specifically outlined by the 
1949 amendment, we are in the realm of speculation. 
3. The contract prices under the statute were binding 
upon the Commission as to value. 
The statutes set out heretofore are plain and unequi-
vocal. There is no ambiguity therein and therefore no 
place for judicial construction. 50 Am. Jur. 225; New 
Park Mining Co. et al., v. State Tax Commission, 196 P 
(2) 485, Utah ; Salt Lake Union Stock Yards 
v. State Tax Commission, 71 P (2) 538; 93 Utah 166. 
The statutory wording is that the mine value shall 
be based upon net annual proceeds of the mine, defined 
to be "the gross proceeds realized * * * from the sale 
or conversion into money or its equivalent, of all ores 
from such mine or mining claim extracted by the owner 
* * *", less specified deductions. 
There is no authority for the Commission to vary 
this legislative mandate when for any reason it feels 
that the owner might have charged more or spent less in 
its operations, and so have realized more from the sale 
or conversion into money or its equivalent of the mine's 
ores. 
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Would it be contended that if the contract prices 
were more than the Commission's conception of gross 
market values, the lesser figure could be used? 
The Tax Commission in collecting the occupation 
tax under Section 80-5-66 originally took the position 
asserted here, that is, that it could substitute its own 
estimate of what the mine owner should have received. 
The wording of Secion 80-5-66 is slightly different, read-
ing as follows: 
The basis for computing the occupation tax 
imposed by this act for any year shall be as 
follows: 
(a) If the ore or metals extracted is sold 
under a bona fide contract of sale, the amount 
of money or its equivalent actually received by 
the owner, lessee, contractor or other person 
operating the mine or mining claims, from the 
sale of all ores or metals during the calendar 
year * . 
This statute likewise is plain and unequivocal. Here, 
too, is no ambiguity and therefore there is no place for 
"construct ion" by the court. Since a direct review in 
this court was possible, plaintiff at once appealed, Case 
No. 7232. Whereupon the Tax Commission stipulated for 
dismissal and refunded the additional tax paid under 
protest, since it had been assessed on a basis other than 
as provided by the legislature. 
Subsequently and consistent with abandonment of 
its first effort to obtain judicial legislation, the Commis-
sion submitted to the 1949 legislature and there was en-
acted as House Bill No. 179 the following: 
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A N A C T A M E N D I N G SECTION 80-5-57, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943, RELAT-
ING TO THE IMPOSITION OF A NET 
ANNUAL PROCEEDS TAX AND SETTING 
FORTH THE MANNER OF ARRIVING 
AT THE TAX LIABILITY. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of 
Utah: 
Section 1. Sec. 80-5-57, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, is amended to read: 
80-5-57. The words, "ne t annual proceeds," 
of a metalliferous mine or mining claim are de-
fined to be the gross proceeds realized during 
the preceding calendar year from the sale or 
conversion into money or its equivalent of all 
ores from such mine or mining claim extracted 
by the owner or lessee, contractor or other per-
son working upon or operating the property, 
including all dumps and tailings, during or pre-
vious to the year for which the assessment is 
made ( ) ; provided, that in cases where * * * 
the gross proceeds realized from the ore is dis-
proportionate to its reasonable fair cash value, 
the tax commission shall place a value on the ore 
which is equal to its reasonable fair cash value, 
and said amount shall be taken as the basis for 
the tax. The following, and no other, deductions 
may be taken \ # * * 
This action (no doubt at the instance of Iron County 
and the Tax Commission) could not of course effect the 
pending action. This statute did not become law until 
May 10th of 1949. Ch. 79, Session Laws of Utah 1949. 
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4. Authorities cited by defendant are not here applic-
able. 
Anticipating reiteration of argument in this court 
along the lines submitted by defendant below, plaintiff 
wishes to point out that the circumstances surrounding 
this case are in sharp contrast to illustrations relied 
upon in the District Court. 
For example, cases cited by defendant involving 
delegations of specific legislative authority to the taxing 
agency to substitute its estimate for contract prices, are 
not here in point. An illustration would be a case now 
arising under Section 80-5-57 as amended by the legisla-
ture in 1949, Chapter 79. Another such instance would 
be under the occupation tax law, Section 80-5-66, as like-
wise amended by the Utah legislature in 1949, Chapter 
80. Still another instance would be a case arising under 
Section 80-5-66(b) where it is provided that in the event 
of controversy with respect to whether or not particular 
smelting charges are appropriate " t he Tax Commission 
shall have power to determine such rates or charges." 
Likewise, under income tax law, there is specific 
authority for the Tax Commission to disregard corpor-
ate entity. Section 80-12-18, for example, reads as 
follows: 
80-13-18. Allocation of Income and Deductions 
Between Several Corporations Con-
trolled by Same Interests. 
In any case of two or more corporations 
(whether or not organized or doing business in 
this state, and whether or not affiliated) owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same 
interests, the tax commission is authorized to 
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distribute, apportion or allocate gross income 
or deductions between or among such corpora-
tions, if it determines that such distribution, ap-
portionment or allocation is necessary in order 
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect 
the income of any of such corporations. 
Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code is the Con-
gressional grant to the Collector of Internal Revenue of 
this same type of authority. But that this power even 
when granted is limited and to be strictly construed, see 
Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F. 
(2d) 508 (OCA 6th, 1940), where it was held that the 
Commissioner could not create income even as between 
affiliates when none in fact existed. There the Commis-
sioner had assessed additional rental income against the 
parent company on the theory that the subsidiary should 
have paid the additional amount as a reasonable rental 
for equiment. 
p 
Likewise, we are aware of the general rule and its 
multitude of specific illustrations in the cases to the 
effect that the corporate veil may be pierced by courts 
to prevent fraud or illegality. As is said in 13 Am. Jnr. 
160, Corporation®, § 17: 
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal 
entity existing separate and apart from the per-
sons composing it is a legal theory introduced for 
purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends 
of justice. The concept cannot, therefore, be ex-
tended to a point beyond its reason and policy, 
and when invoked in support of an end subversive 
of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts. 
Thus, in an appropriate case and in furtherance 
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of the ends of justice, a corporation and the in-
dividual or individuals owning all its stock and 
assets will be treated as identical, the corporate 
entity being disregarded where used as a cloak 
or cover for fraud or illegality. 
In contrast, in the instant case there is not only no 
legislative grant of authority; there is further no sugges-
tion of fraud or illegality in connection with the original 
execution of the contracts when negotiated at arm's length 
between plaintiff and the United States Government. The 
mere happenstance that some years later one of the out-
standing contracts should be acquired by another com-
pany, which we have frankly stipulated is another wholly 
owned subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation, 
should not be made the excuse for judicial legislation in 
an effort to acquire further tax revenue. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
lower court should be set aside, and the case remanded 
to the District Court with directions to grant relief 
in accordance with plaintiff's prayer and the mandate 
of Utah 's legislature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
WM. M. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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